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Abstract: Despite Heidegger’s critique of ethics, his use of ethically-inflected 
language intimates an interpretive ethics of encounter involving self-interpret-
ing agents in their hermeneutical context and the formal indication of factical 
life as a situated dwelling open to possibilities enacted through practices of 
care, interpretation, and individuation. Existence is constituted practically in 
Dasein’s addressing, encountering, and responding to itself, others, and its 
world. Unlike rule-based or virtue ethics, this ethos of responsive encounter 
and individuating confrontation challenges any grounding in a determinate or 
exemplary model of reason, human nature, the virtues, or tradition.
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1 . The Trouble with Ethics1
In a lecture delivered in 1946, Jean Wahl expressed the ambivalence of 
Heidegger’s ethics when he claimed in rapid succession that it was merely for-
mal, ambiguously allowed a plurality of possible readings, and was in the end 
I wish to express my thanks to Lauren Freeman for her comments on an earlier version of this 
paper, and for her own research on Heidegger and ethics, which encouraged me to refine the 
arguments presented here.
1 Heidegger references, referred to as GA with volume and page numbers, are to the pagina-
tion of Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976-ongoing, unless noted. The following 
abbreviations are also used: SZ: Sein und Zeit, sixteenth edition, Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 
1985. Translations: Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York: Harper 
and Row, 1962 and Being and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh, Albany: SUNY Press, 1996. PM: 
Wegmarken, second edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978 / Pathmarks, trans. W. McNeill, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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not an ethics at all.2 Notwithstanding some notable efforts at locating the eth-
ical in Heidegger’s works, the prevailing perspective of both his defenders and 
critics continues to reject any ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thought. This 
standard account is not without a basis in Heidegger’s own self-interpretation, 
as he repeatedly denied that his work concerned ethics understood as an ontic 
domain of inquiry such as sociology or anthropology and was suspicious of 
the very language of “ethics” and “values.” If ethics is an ontic and empiri-
cal instead of an ontological issue, and the ontological is transcendentally or 
dualistically separated from the ontic, then there appears to be no place for 
the ethical.
The absence of the ethical in Heidegger’s works is either due to its being: 
(1) descriptively neutral, ethically indifferent, or merely disinterested (which 
can be designated as the value-neutrality or, in Levinasian terms, the ontologi-
cal indifference thesis3), or (2) intrinsically annihilative, violent, and unethical 
(which might be called the nihilism thesis4). The former thesis is sometimes 
considered to be a defense of Heidegger’s ontology even though it cannot res-
cue it from its critics, since it abandons it to them. Critics such as Habermas 
can then rightly claim that Heidegger’s phenomenology remains captured in 
the unacknowledged and unresolved performative aporias of “crypto-norma-
tive” and “transcendental” philosophy, whereas Levinas or Žižek can justifi-
ably contend that the indifference and neutrality of ontology is intrinsically 
unethical, socially irresponsible, and perhaps evil.5
2 J. Wahl, Petite histoire de l’“existentialisme,” suivie de Kafka et Kierkegaard: Commentaires, 
Paris: Club Maintenant, 1946. This passage is discussed in S. Moyn, Origins of the Other: Em-
manuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, p. 204.
3 This is not to deny some objectifying tendencies in Being and Time that would serve to sup-
port this view. It does suggest their tension with the movement toward a more originary thinking 
of the ethical, as shown in W. McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, Albany: SUNY Press, 1999, p. 94. 
For Levinas, moral indifference characterizes both ontology and phenomenology as in E. Levinas, 
Basic Philosophical Writings, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996, pp. 98-100.
4 An early critique of Heidegger along these lines is found in K. Löwith, Martin Heidegger 
and European Nihilism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, it is also made by Levinas. 
For a detailed account of the issues of indifference and violence, and their connections, see F. 
Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in Heidegger’s Thought, Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2006, pp. 139-140. On phenomenological neutrality, see R. J. Dostal, “Time and 
Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,” in C. B. Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Heidegger, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 138.
5 The charge of unethical crypto-normativism is made in J. Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. F. Lawrence, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, pp. 
131-160. For Habermas, post-Nietzschean philosophy remains within the aporias of subjective 
reason and crypto-normativism (ibid., 97-105, 301), the latter is particularly problematic in 
discourses presupposing value-neutrality (ibid., 284). Levinas connects the neutrality and indif-
ference of ontology with the unethical, frequently associating it with Heidegger’s involvement 
with National Socialism. See E. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, op . cit., ch. one and six. 
On formalism, indifference, and the unethical, note S. Žižek, The Parallax View, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2006, p. 87.
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Responding to such criticisms, I suggest that the value-neutrality and the 
nihilism thesis are unsatisfactory interpretations and, if Heidegger did not 
eliminate the ethical for the sake of neutrality or anti-ethical nihilism, the 
question of the ethical needs to be raised anew. The question concerning the 
ethical import of his critique of ethics as ontic, confused, and derivative re-
quires interrogating the meaning of “ethics” and pursuing whether ordinary 
and conventional discourses about ethics and values, including those asserting 
its primacy, disclose or conceal the ethical.
2 . Being without Ethics?
Heidegger consistently rejected ethics understood as: (1) arbitrary subjec-
tive assertions and choices about “worldviews” and “values”6 and (2) objective 
and systematic rational or scientific accounts of rules, principles, norms, and 
axioms. These two ways of conceptualizing ethics characterize the discourse 
of ethics in the early twentieth-century and presuppose modern accounts of 
subjectivity and objectivity rooted in the metaphysical tradition. If these dis-
courses exhaust the meaning of ethics, Heidegger cannot be an ethical thinker, 
since Being and Time aims at the destructuring (Destruktion) of the divisions 
between subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity, and being and value. 
If one considers Heidegger’s questioning of the division of philosophy into 
separate disciplines such as ethics and epistemology in addition to the radical 
disjunction of facts and norms, or the facticity and normativity of transcen-
dental philosophy, the context of Heidegger’s problematization of ethics be-
comes clearer and his doubts concerning ethical theory more plausible insofar 
as they do not necessarily exclude the ethical in a wider sense. Heidegger’s 
critique did not aim at the various ways one can be ethical. He did not sys-
tematically critique previous ethical systems and doctrines, advocate an im-
moralist or nihilistic rhetoric, nor justify a global moral skepticism. There 
is no challenge to ethics in the name of the anti-ethical, nor the pretense of 
transcending the ethical in the value neutrality of impartial scientific objectiv-
ity or transcendental neutrality of phenomenological description.
In spite of Heidegger’s recurring claims that he is driven by the question of 
being, and disinterested in ethics as an ontic discipline or subjective assertion 
about world-views7, he intermittently mentioned the possibility of articulat-
ing an ethics from the perspective of a worked out “metaphysics of existence.”8 
These two claims are incoherent unless the ethical (1) was bracketed rather 
6 On the questionable character of discourses about values, see F. Olafson, Heidegger and 
the Ground of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 92-93, and L. Hatab, 
Ethics and Finitude, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 89-91.
7 GA 26, pp. 18-22, 171.
8 Ibid., p. 199.
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than eliminated by fundamental ontology and (2) to be re-awakened in a new 
and alternative sense, a strategy seen in his 1928 project of “metontology” and 
the metaphysics of human existence. This contention, based on the lecture 
courses of the late 1920s, is strengthened by the preliminary and incomplete 
character of Being and Time. Issues not mentioned or discussed – such as 
ethics, the animal, the body, gender, and sociality – are not necessarily insig-
nificant, particularly if they are further illuminated in related lecture courses 
and later writings.9
In addition to stating that ontology provided a basis for ethics, a claim 
Heidegger repeated in speaking of an originary ethos of dwelling in the Letter on 
Humanism, his writings and lectures of the 1920s display their own normative 
commitments as he employed some varieties of ethically-charged and inflected 
language. Heidegger modified traditional concepts such that it is unclear if and 
to what extent they share in their previous religious, metaphysical, and ethical 
meanings. Responding to this concern by appealing to the non-hermeneutical 
neutrality of the transcendental or ontological begs the question insofar as it 
presupposes instead of demonstrating ethical indifference. This visible ethical 
inflection intriguingly places in question previous portrayals of Heidegger’s phe-
nomenology by implicating the most basic concepts of Being and Time. These 
include authenticity, care, choice, conscience, decision, everydayness, freedom, 
responsibility, resoluteness, solicitude, the “they” or “one,” destruction and tra-
dition, and individuated being-there (Dasein) itself.
Throughout the 1920s, Heidegger used ordinary ethical language in ap-
pealing to moral obligations and virtues such as perseverance, loyalty, dignity, 
courage, and commitment. He did not eliminate but appealed to the exem-
plary character of various philosophical and other virtues. What can only be 
described as the virtue of lingering in the question remained a fundamental 
commitment of his thinking.10 Just as Levinas’s language fails to escape ontol-
ogy in its movement toward an ethics without being, Heidegger’s idiom is 
never ontological to the extent that it escapes the ethical.
Lawrence Hatab has argued that authenticity is more appropriately in-
terpreted as an exemplary model or virtue than as a norm, rule, or value.11 
Given this virtue-ethical tendency in Heidegger’s language, if not the mastery 
and self-sufficiency of the ideal citizen rooted in a definitive and exemplary 
account of the function and nature of human existence, the phenomenologi-
cal neutrality thesis does not have much validity. It has none, if Heidegger is 
not a transcendental or crypto-transcendental philosopher, as he remains for 
9 Volumes 26, 27, and 29/30 discuss all of these examples.
10 Derrida’s deployment of terms such as dignity, duty, decision and responsibility in his 
discussion of the question of the question, and its priority, in Heidegger also points towards 
its ethical character. Compare S. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, second edition, Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 96.
11 On authenticity as a virtue, for example, see L. Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, op . cit., p. 118.
HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTIONABILITY OF THE ETHICAL 415
Habermas, but critically confronted transcendental phenomenology for the 
sake of its hermeneutical and historical-destructuring transformation. This 
suggests that the transcendental, universal, and formal – which can and should 
not be eliminated as popular irrationalism assumes – are persistently referred 
back to the facticity of the singular entangled in and exposed to a concrete and 
plural nexus of significations and their breakdowns. Heidegger described his 
early project as the formal indication or hermeneutics of factical life. If this is 
the most fitting way to understand the strategy of Being and Time, as Kisiel 
and others have argued12, the project of a hermeneutics of facticity cannot be 
neutral or indifferent. Despite his bracketing of “ethics” as ontic, confused, or 
non-originary13, his thinking remains in some sense ethical. Heidegger might 
be “ethically challenged” yet he is not “without ethics.”
3 . Beyond Neutrality and Nihilism
The unethical nihilism thesis, associated with Habermas and Levinas, has 
the merit of being more plausible than the neutrality thesis, as the politi-
cal and ethical problems of the person appear to seamlessly complement the 
ethical deficits of the philosophy. As such, this issue is and ought to be more 
troubling. If one condemns the evil of National Socialism, acknowledges the 
absolute horror of the Shoah, and wants to avoid being complicit with or an 
apologist for murder and injustice, can one maintain the ethical significance 
of Heidegger’s philosophy? The polemical literature concerning Heidegger has 
a valuable role in promoting such questioning.
Given the failure of the neutrality thesis, the only avenue of adequately 
answering the nihilism thesis, unfolded in various ways from the youthful 
Arendt and Löwith to Levinas and Habermas, is to exhibit the ethical import 
of Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. This is not found in what he 
directly wrote about ethics, since he did not write much, but in what he indi-
rectly indicated about ethics (1) through basic concepts from authenticity and 
responsibility to responsive encounter and individuating conflict and (2) in 
the hermeneutical practice, performance, and enactment of his thinking. 
At the same time as Heidegger disputed the significance of ethics, inter-
preted as arbitrary assertions of subjective values and worldviews or as objec-
tive value theory, system, and axiology, his philosophical practice exhibits and 
provokes ethical reflection just as his works invoke and entail individuation 
through responsibility. The following paragraphs make the case that Heide-
gger’s thought hermeneutically indicates the ethical, although not in order to 
save Heidegger from his critics. It is an attempt to articulate a demystified and 
12  T. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993.
13 SZ, p. 16.
ERIC SEAN NELSON416
situated notion of the ethical – if imperfectly achieved in Heidegger’s works 
– which is hermeneutically appropriate to the singularity, individuation, frac-
tured immanence, finitude, and facticity of human existence, including the 
confrontation with its injustices, suffering, and pain. This ethical prospect is 
opened up in Heidegger’s ontological questioning of being that usually seems 
so distant from and other than the ethical.
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of factical life, explicated through the formal 
indication and analysis of human existence as the individuating being-there of 
Dasein, is an interpretive and thus not a purely formal “meta-ethics.” Ontology 
is meta-ethical rather than anti-ethical as it enacts a practice concerned with 
the possibilities and conditions of the individuation of human existence in the 
midst of others, things, and the world. Being and Time accordingly presents 
us with fragments of the ethical that oblige us to appropriate and individuate 
them anew. The analysis of Dasein is ethical not only because of Heidegger’s 
redefinition of traditional ethical concepts such as authenticity, engaged con-
science, freedom, guilt, phronesis, and responsibility but by the enactment 
or performance of thinking as Begegnung (responsive encounter) and Ausein-
andersetzung (differentiating confrontation) with things, others, and oneself. 
Heidegger’s interpretive and linguistic practices indicate and enact the ethical 
through its being-with (Mitsein) as a question addressing, distinguishing, and 
individuating Dasein as each time singularly its own. The ethical tendency 
of Heidegger’s early language is continued in his later differentiation of the 
responsiveness of thinking from the mastery of philosophy in the context of 
mindfulness or attentive reflection (Besinnung) enacting the letting release-
ment of things (Gelassenheit). Such self-emptying generosity, unselfish yet not 
thereby without self, contradicts the self-interested and egocentric obsession 
with one’s own death ascribed to Dasein by critics and an immoral nihilism 
setting up and tearing down values without attentiveness to the beings that 
ethics is supposed to address.
4 . Logos and the Ethical Event of Communication
Logos, conventionally translated as language or reason, is a basic word of 
the philosophical tradition and Heidegger’s engagement with it from his early 
to late works. As a basic word, which Heidegger repeatedly returned to in dif-
ferent contexts, we should consider whether it excludes the ethical or whether 
the communicative encounter and event of logos discloses an alternative yet 
nevertheless still ethical dimension. Logos is a formally indicative concept en-
acted throughout Being and Time. Although Heidegger does not formally dis-
cuss the phenomenon of language until later in Being and Time14, the question 
14 SZ, p. 160.
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of language is fundamentally already at work from the opening question of 
the meaning and sense of being. Via the posing of this question, and the initial 
discussions of tradition, hermeneutics, phenomeno-logy, and destructuring 
(Destruktion), Heidegger operates in relation to the question of language as 
logos, a point that is strengthened by considering the early lecture courses.
In his early hermeneutics, Heidegger is already a philosopher of language 
and communication as logos or the event of communication. Language not 
only occurs as talking about (besprechen) something from a third-person 
objectivating perspective, it is also described as a lived enactment (Vollzug) 
and address (ansprechen). As Heidegger claimed in 1926, the former predi-
cative statement (“truth about”) is rooted in the latter relational encounter 
(“truth for”).15 Dasein only “speaks about” something because it “speaks out” 
in “speaking with” others.16 The structuring of human existence through the 
communicative event of addressing and being addressed distinguishes the ex-
istence of Dasein as dis-covering.17 This language of address, of claiming and 
being claimed, of responding and co-responding, emerged in relation to the 
question of logos in the earliest lecture courses and continues to inform the 
responsiveness of poetic language formulated in his later works; his previ-
ous and later thought share in this care for the word. The event of address 
and being addressed, of being claimed and responding to the claim, resonates 
throughout the transformations of Heidegger’s thought.
In the context of discussing Aristotle and the hermeneutical situation in 
the mid-1920s, Heidegger explicated the relation of logos and being through 
the address-character of encountering the world: “The world is always en-
countered in a specific way of being addressed, in being claimed (logos).”18 
Discourse is “a fundamental determination of Dasein itself ” and disclosive 
logos “is the basic comportment of being-true that Dasein is.”19 The primordial 
meaning of logos is the communicative event of address and is accordingly 
prior to and opens the possibility of logos as logic and the communicative ac-
tion of giving and taking reasons. Logos signifies responding and attending to 
something as that something.20
Heidegger associated language with receptivity already in 1919/20 when 
he speaks of the phenomenological relationship to the phenomena as one of 
giving oneself over to (Hingabe) and letting (lassen) rather than positing or 
15 T. Kisiel and T. Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 
1910-1927, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007, p. 287.
16 Ibid., p. 204.
17 Ibid., p. 287, and SZ, p. 45.
18 M. Heidegger, “Ph�nomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der herme-
neutischen Situation),” in H.U. Lessing (ed.), Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 6: 237-69, p. 241.
19 T. Kisiel and T. Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger, op . cit., p. 224.
20 GA 27, p. 200.
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constituting.21 He goes further in describing it as an eros in which one lets 
oneself go (sich-los-lassen) into life.22 Life is gained by giving oneself over to it 
as is philosophy, which is accordingly not the neutrality of objective meaning, 
the differentiating concern yet uncaring indifference of everydayness, or the 
lack of concern with one’s own possibilities.23 This life, using the language of 
Lebensphilosophie that he later criticized, is the enactment and practice of the 
life that one is. Phenomenology as letting-be-seen is not an indifferent and 
neutral intellectual receptivity, passivity, or collecting.24 It is responding recep-
tiveness to how the world shows itself by letting it show itself. Such letting, 
occurring through the “as,” is interpretative and appropriative as entities and 
world are disclosed as world and as entities of one sort or another.25 Heidegger 
concluded “What is Metaphysics?” later that decade by drawing attention to 
the need to “allow space for beings as a whole” and “release ourselves into the 
nothing.”26 This language of allowing, giving, letting, and releasing is not ac-
cidental or irrelevant to the strategies and stakes of Heidegger’s works. It dis-
closes its ethical dimension, suggesting an alternative to the reduction of the 
differentiated multiplicity of his thinking to the static “unity” and “totality” of 
ontology that he himself radically placed in question.27
The language of “passivity” is often opposed to that of “activity,” as Heide-
gger’s work is reconstructed according to a dialectic of solipsistic Dasein and 
collective and communitarian Mitsein or “activist decisionism” and “passivist 
resignation.”28 These are thought to reflect the arrogant self-assertion of the will 
and passive submission to irrational natural forces and collectivist anonymity.29 
Such interpretations problematically conflate the openness of responsiveness 
with the violence of subordination and subjugation, reducing his thinking to 
21 Note Kisiel’s comments on phenomenology as Hingabe in T. Kisiel, The Genesis, op . cit., p. 28.
22 GA 58, p. 263.
23 Hingabe is discussed in GA 58, p. 168. Hatab interprets “indifference” as a deficient 
mode of the empathy of solicitude in L. Hatab, Ethics and Finitude, op . cit., p. 144. Heidegger 
ascribed a kind of indifference and neutrality to everydayness, although it is absorbed in self-
interest and self-concern, as closing off possibilities for individuation and solicitude.
24 E. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, op . cit., pp. 96-98. That is, “the indifference of 
the disclosed” and its “dependen[ce] upon intelligibility” that Levinas describes in the “Truth of 
Disclosure and Truth of Testimony” as the effacement of the human in Dasein.
25 On the contrast between the hermeneutic and apophantic “as,” see GA 21, pp. 135-161.
26 PM, 96.
27 Heidegger clarified this in the mid-1930s. On unity, see GA 65, pp. 41, 209, and 460. 
On totality, see GA 65, pp. 29, 146, and 323.
28 Although Moyn perpetuates the opposition between Dasein and Mitsein, he shows how 
Heidegger’s students and critics saw these terms disjunctively as a dilemma rather than Dasein 
being the individuation of Mitsein in S. Moyn, Origins of the Other, op . cit., pp. 62-87.
29 On Levinas’s critique of the “self-interested decisionism” and the “anonymous indiffer-
ence of being,” see T. Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001, p. 28. Such a developmental reconstruction is seen in J. Habermas, “Work and 
Weltanschauung: The Heidegger-Controversy from a German Perspective,” trans. J. McCum-
ber, Critical Inquiry 15 (Winter 1989), pp. 431-456.
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one-side of this duality of activist spontaneity and passive receptivity.30 However, 
Heidegger unfolded this different dimension through a mindful responsiveness 
challenging the binary logic of spontaneity and receptivity. Since it involves be-
ing claimed and the interpretive transformative answer, responsiveness is neither 
pure activity nor passivity. It is this opening, freeing, and letting that allows 
existence to be interpreted and individuated for oneself.
Individuation does not entail being enclosed within an isolated and reified 
identity, as it is existence stepping out of itself in the world and allowing the 
world and others to be significant for it. Heidegger portrays “letting” as pri-
mordially being moved and affected:
Letting something be encountered is primarily circumspective; it is not just 
sensing something, or staring at it. It implies circumspective concern, and has 
the character of being affected in some way […].31
This letting-be-encountered is made possible by the primordial activity of 
the being-there of Dasein, which is described in 1928/1929 as the openness 
of letting beings be (Seinlassen des Seienden) and as the releasement into beings 
of Gelassenheit.32 As a hermeneutical and communicative encounter occurring 
in a between rather than within consciousness or the intellect, letting is not 
only passive comprehension or the letting of consciousness as Levinas assert-
ed.33 The question of letting is further complicated, however, because Heide-
gger is not merely a thinker of responsiveness as receptivity to the diversity of 
things but more fundamentally of responsiveness caught up in conflict and 
the singularization of differentiation and individuation. How one responds, 
as a finite, mortal, and partial being, is inevitably enmeshed with questions of 
injustice and violence, which Levinas identified with a condition of war.34 The 
interdependence and “between” of responsive encounter and differentiation 
(Begegnung and Auseinandersetzung) and agonistic conflict (Widerstreit), such 
as that of earth and world described in the works of the mid-1930s, under-
mines ethics in its traditional metaphysical sense.
5 . Thrownness, Communicative Address, and Individuating Response
What does it mean to address (ansprechen) and be addressed (angesprochen)? 
Address is often interpreted as “appeal” yet this identification is problematic 
in Heidegger’s case. In a note in Metaphysics and Nihilism from the late 1930s, 
30 See Heidegger’s discussion of spontaneity and receptivity in GA 27, pp. 74-75.
31 SZ, p. 176.
32 Heidegger speaks of Seinlassen des Seienden in GA 27, pp. 180 and 198-199 and Gelas-
senheit in GA 27, p. 214.
33 E. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, op . cit., p. 6.
34 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by A. Lingis, Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1979, preface.
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Heidegger denies that philosophy should be understood as an “appeal” (appel) 
that is analogous with either a moral or military command.35 The interpolation 
of philosophy has been explored as a poetics of address and response, of letting 
(Gelassenheit) as responsiveness in Heidegger’s later thinking, yet this reflection 
already emerges in the early Heidegger. Dasein’s factical possibilities are misin-
terpreted if interpreted as the spontaneity and self-certainty of the modern epis-
temological subject. Dasein does not exist in general; it exists only as itself.36 It 
is always already (immer schon) addressed and therefore each time (je) addressed 
anew as “worldish” (weltlich) and as being-with-others (mitseiend). Dasein re-
sists being thought through the prism of an isolated essence or identity, even if 
Heidegger later abandoned the early focus on Dasein in favor of being (Sein).37
Dasein finds itself thrown into a world in which it occurs and enacts itself 
through understanding (verstehend-in-der-Welt) and differentiation (ausein-
andersetzend-in-der-Welt). Contrary to the premises of moral liberalism and 
communitarianism, this understanding involves Dasein’s entire disposition, 
comportment, and attunement and so is not merely intellectual or a ques-
tion of calculative rational choice. As understanding is constantly threatened 
by being shaken, overturned, and transformed, it is also not an unalterable 
structure of tradition, prejudice, or common life. Two arguments from the 
Winter semester of 1923/24 indicate that (1) understanding as Auseinander-
setzung refuses the closure of prejudice or an imposition of identity on that 
which is to be understood (verstehen as world-opening rather than totalizing), 
and (2) encountering (Begegnung) occurs through the openness of address and 
being addressed, an openness that Heidegger reaffirmed later in the decade 
when he argued that Dasein has already stepped out of itself into the open-
ness of the other.38 The first claim is discernible in Heidegger’s remark that 
freedom is not independence from preconditions and preconceptions but the 
freedom to abandon these in critically engaging the thing itself.39 We are not 
35 GA 67, pp. 26 and 53.
36 GA 27, p. 5.
37 See GA 61, p. 102 and H. Ruin, Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity 
through Heidegger’s Works, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1994, ch. 3. The historicity of 
Dasein, according to Hans Ruin, is a “dialectic” of self and other, identity and difference (pp. 
128-133). Instead of dialectic, suggesting mediation and identity, I describe it as the respon-
sive encounter or differentiating conflict of “verstehende Auseinandersetzung” (GA 61, p. 2) or 
responsive “Widerstreit.”
38 GA 27, p. 138. Interestingly, given its discussion of self and other, Einleitung in die 
Philosophie is the course that Levinas attended while studying in Freiburg. This response to 
Levinas’s critique of Heidegger is developed in J. Greisch, “The ‘Play of Transcendence’ and 
the Question of Ethics,” F. Raffoul and D. Pettigrew (eds.), Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, 
Albany: SUNY Press, 2002, p. 104.
39 GA 17, p. 2. The young Heidegger already spoke of Auseinandersetzung in the context 
of Verstehen: “Es ist prinzipiell alles auf Auseinandersetzung gestellt, auf Verstehen in und aus 
dieser Auseinandersetzung. Diese existenziell bestimmte verstehende Auseinandersetzung ist 
‘einseitig’ von außen . . .” (GA 61, p. 2). Verstehende Auseinandersetzung appears again in the 
late 1930’s in Wege zur Aussprache (GA 13).
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free from and cannot suspend all presuppositions and prejudices in under-
standing, as liberal moral theory idealistically suggests, yet they are features 
of understanding and the construction of things that are potentially reversed, 
revised, and resisted through the differentiation of encounter and confronta-
tion. The second remark affirmed that language and understanding do not 
necessarily begin in the arbitrary and violent imposition of a verbal, social, or 
mental construct upon things. The relation of saying and the thing can occur 
in the disclosive encounter of claiming and being claimed by that thing and its 
world, by words through which the world speaks and shows itself.40
The early Heidegger analyzed understanding as occurring and being enacted 
in the openness of the encounter. Since Heidegger’s worldly and fractured im-
manence is not the transparent intelligibility of knowing but the emergence and 
counter-emergence of the thing concealing and unconcealing itself in encoun-
tering us, he is not committed to immanence interpreted as a closed, indifferent, 
and unitary totality.41 The fractured and plural openness of Heidegger’s being, 
analogous to Dilthey’s Zusammenhang, challenges the reduction of the whole to 
a systematic totality that sublimates and subordinates each particular to a uni-
versal origin or principle. Being is the openness for Heidegger in which freedom 
as transcendence in worldly immanence ecstatically takes place. The formal in-
dication of the forestructures and prejudices of understanding does not preclude 
but radicalizes the question of the singularity of its enactment – a uniqueness 
indicated in the each case of the “je” – and the alterity of the encountered that 
potentially places each and my own existence into question.42 This being placed 
and lingering in the question is not nihilistic destruction as it opens up alterna-
tive and potentially more genuine possibilities. This recognition of singulariza-
tion in relation to a worldly, social, and historical nexus intimates an ethos of 
earthly dwelling and a this-worldly responsibility of and for finite mortals that 
counters its other-worldly mystification.
As interpretively dispersed into the world rather than transcendentally con-
stituting it, my existence is not self-transparently available to me in self-intuition 
and self-narrative. Existence is each time factical and consequently confronted 
and thrown into question by that which resists, interrupts, and escapes it. Self-
40 GA 17, p. 21. On the significance of addressing/being addressed, note Heidegger’s claim 
in Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache: “Gesetzt, daß wir alles, was nicht nichts ist, 
als ein Seiendes oder Sein ansprechen müssen, dann ist auch die Sprache, sollte sie selbst st�ndig 
werden” (GA 38, p. 25). Also note in Vom Wesen der Sprache: “Das Wort – nicht als Singular 
zu Wörtern, nicht ein einzelnes ‘Wort’, sondern Nennung, Zu-, Anspruch und vor dem und 
wesentlich Wort des Seins [...]” (GA 85, p. 56).
41 E. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, op . cit., p. 100.
42 On the logic of singularity, and the singularity and plurality of Jemeinigkeit, see F. Raffoul, 
Heidegger and the Subject, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1998, pp. 215-221. On the logical and 
hermeneutical character of formal indication, see my articles: “Questioning Practice: Heidegger, 
Historicity and the Hermeneutics of Facticity.” Philosophy Today 44, 2001 (SPEP Supplement 
2000), pp. 150-159; “Die formale Anzeige der Faktizit�t als Frage der Logik,” Heidegger und die 
Logik, A. Denker and H. Zaborowski (eds.), Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006, pp. 31-48.
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knowledge is practical rather than theoretical, requiring the decentering of the 
self in its ordinary self-certainty and absorption in everyday affairs. Philosophy 
in its ruinating facticity is for the early Heidegger the enactment of such ques-
tionability.43 This questionability arises because Dasein usually and for the most 
part takes itself, others, and its environing world for granted in the indifferent 
familiarity of everydayness. As radically thrown and factically implicated in the 
world, existence is not simply the openness and clarity of its possibilities, even if 
the futural and possible have priority over the past and the actual.
Dasein does not constitute, make, or throw itself. The true is not the made, 
as facticity is not merely its own reified second nature or an easily modified 
product. Individuated being-there is itself only as thrown into and thus en-
twined with the world, it does not belong to itself but fundamentally to the 
world and others. It is not only thrown (geworfen) into the facticity of the world 
and a particular generation, and hence never the virtuous or vicious master of 
its world or its others, it is fallen (verfallen) from its own-most possibilities in 
the facticity of in-different everydayness. Thrownness and fallenness, as two 
modes of facticity, unalterably constitute and positively characterize Dasein in 
its finite way of being. The ethical is immanently lived and enacted in the ethos 
of its dwelling, i.e., in Dasein’s art and manner of existing, rather than operat-
ing according to an external logic of function, norm, reason, virtue, or even 
transcendent alterity. The self is responsive to non-self only by being a situ-
ated and worldly self that can or cannot be itself. It cannot escape or master 
its facticity and alterity to itself, as these are constitutive, but only encounter 
and respond to them. By how or the way it responds, the self flees from or 
embraces its own thrown and fallen, finite and mortal, condition. Authentic-
ity is not a rule or virtue. It is a communicative event of encounter and only a 
shifting modification of rather than the overcoming of inauthenticity.
6 . The Facticity of the Ethical
Giorgio Agamben shows in “The Passion of Facticity” how facticity as 
fallenness emerges from Heidegger’s early interpretation of Saint Augustine, 
where facticity as “the made” is explicated according to the non-originari-
ness and fallenness of man, as fetish and idol, in contrast with what is made 
and done by God.44 Non-self-originary, human facticius is opposed to the 
self-originariness of the divine nativus. Demonstrating the positivity of the 
“originary non-originariness” of Dasein in characterizing it as fallen and 
ruinated, Heidegger’s analysis runs contrary Augustine’s Manichean under-
standing of facticity as mere fetishism and sin. This reading allows us to 
dispute Levinas’s identification of Heidegger’s recognition of the finitude, 
43 GA 61, pp. 151-155.
44 G. Agamben, Potentialities, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, pp. 185-204.
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immanence, and mortality of existence with abandonment in the darkness 
of “pagan” idolatry and participation.45
Finitude, the impossibility of the pure subject and its self-mastery, is more 
than an accident or fault externally added to human existence; it is its lived 
and practiced condition. “Authenticity” is not the overcoming and master-
ing of finitude. Such a vision is itself an inauthentic flight before one’s own 
unmasterable finitude. As self-relating finitude confronted by infinity, Dasein 
can at best only be authentically inauthentic or inauthentically authentic:
The authentic being of Dasein is what it is only insofar as it is inauthenti-
cally authentic, that is, ‘preserved’ in itself. [Authenticity] is not anything that 
should or could exist for itself next to the inauthentic.46
One condition is not overcome by a different condition, as both are modi-
fications of and different ways of relating to the same everydayness.
Dasein exists usually and for the most part in everyday indifference, only 
realizing the openness of its possibilities in the pain and trauma of anxiety, 
dread, and the deepest boredom – that is, in the disrupting uncanniness of 
individuating encounters. This unmasterable trauma, as a contingent yet una-
voidable break of differentiation, constitutes Dasein’s existence in its facticity 
and possibility. Dasein does not redeem itself or get redeemed from fallenness, 
since it would then no longer be Dasein. It can only fall into and away from 
its falling. Fallenness is in each case Dasein’s own fallenness from its own pos-
sibilities, and thus does not occur from any transcendent height that could 
be localized or named. Since fallenness and thrownness are an irremovable 
originary violence and trauma, which Levinas contends cannot be ethical and 
yet might be the very drama and not merely “tragic” event of the ethical, inau-
thenticity flees to a reified otherness that it is not and can never be.47
Heidegger did not proceed in Being and Time from the individual sub-
ject to the world, as modern epistemology did from Descartes’ Meditations to 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. Despite Levinas’s interpretation, being-with 
and being-in-the-world are not derivative of an analysis that begins with an 
individual consciousness or entity.48 Such a procedure would miss the very 
45 Ibid., p. 189. On Levinas’ s polemical equation of Heidegger, “Hitlerism,” and paganism in the 
1930’s and beyond, see S. Moyn, Origins of the Other, op . cit., pp. 96-108, 190-194, 206-207.
46 “Das eigentliches Sein des Daseins ist, was es ist, nur so, daß es das uneigentliche eigent-
lich ist, d.h. in sich ‘aufhebt.’ Es ist selbst nichts, was gleichsam für sich neben dem uneigentli-
chen bestehen sollte und könnte.” M. Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64, p. 81.
47 E. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings, op . cit., p. 18. Heidegger used a similar strategy in 
approaching the nothing in “What is Metaphysics?” The nothing, revealed in the nihilation in 
human affairs as prior and irreducible to mere negation, can be borne by Dasein in its thrown-
ness but not mastered (PM, pp. 92-93).
48 SZ, p. 388.
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facticity of Dasein.49 If Heidegger does not begin with the everyday self-in-
terested yet basically self-avoiding ego, then a different strategy is called for 
proceeding through the practical everyday world – and the everydayness of 
what everyone does usually and for the most part – to the possibility of the 
individuation and differentiation of Dasein in its everyday being-with-others 
in its environing world.
7 . Caring for “Who”?
Although Heidegger did not explicitly discuss language until §34 of Being 
and Time and historicity until §72, language and history are already at work 
from the beginning. The question of being and the ways in which being has 
remained hidden and unthought is a question of communication and his-
tory. The ontological question is therefore connected with – if in its difference 
irreducible to – the ontic inquiries that Dilthey formulated as the study of 
language, history, and experience.50 Since the ontically oriented empirical sci-
ences, including Dilthey’s human sciences, are implicated in the forgetting of 
being and misinterpretation of Dasein, these are not ontologically abandoned 
but rethought in the context of the question of being.
Whereas being is addressed through the question of its sense, each Dasein 
is addressed through the question of “who?”51 The question of individuated 
being-there does not concern a “what” (even if thought of as person, soul, or 
subject) but “who” in §10. The question of being is not neutrally disinter-
ested; it is an issue for that being who questions itself and who it is and might 
be by questioning being. The ways Dasein hears and listens to the question 
of “who?” is primary to its analysis. Dasein is in being claimed, called upon, 
and addressed, and in claiming and addressing others, and as such is already 
involved in and tied to a nexus of worldly and intersubjective significance. 
However, instead of being a pure receptive listening, Dasein’s prospects for 
hearing are enmeshed in the everydayness that both enables and blocks access 
to oneself, others, and the world. In its practical self-interest in the usefulness 
and instrumentality of things and in its immersion in the common life of ev-
erydayness, Dasein does not usually relate to its possibilities. Insofar as Dasein 
belongs (gehört) to and only hears (hört) out of this everydayness, it does not 
listen toward its possibilities. Everyday Dasein is constantly called upon and 
claimed by others and things, yet it does not hear much less heed them.
49 SZ, p. 229.
50 W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, B. Groethuysen (ed.), fourth edition, 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959, p. xviii / Introduction to the Human Sciences . R. 
Makkreel and F. Rodi (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 51.
51 SZ, pp. 1 and 45.
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Methodologically or formally speaking, phenomenology is responsiveness 
itself and, if responsibility begins in the response not only to others but to 
things and oneself, it is an ethical practice. It continues to be the task of 
phenomenological interpretation to bracket the “natural attitude,” as Husserl 
described, but in order to open and free the possibilities that Dasein already 
is. Heidegger thus explained the task of phenomenology as “to let that which 
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from 
itself.”52 Philosophy is described as reawakening the originary activity of let-
ting and releasement in the lecture course called Introduction to Philosophy 
of 1928/1929, where bringing philosophy underway is to “let” it occur in 
us.53 Philosophizing is the letting occur of transcendence, which Heidegger 
expresses in his later language as the openness of the between, and which is 
bound to the originary praxis of Dasein of releasement.54 Philosophy is sub-
sequently not an act of the spontaneity of being, consciousness, or the will. It 
is philia as receptivity to things, others, and the world, although the philia of 
philosophy is a friendship and trust that cannot exclude conflict.55 The “spon-
taneity of the subject,” to employ Kant’s language, is not an imposition of the 
subject onto others and the world but a fundamental receptivity and “a letting 
be encountered, an intrinsic passivity and receptivity.”56 Heidegger evokes 
his earlier Hingabe when he speaks of receptivity as intrinsically belonging to 
spontaneity and as a free giving over of oneself in the encounter.57
This letting be seen and heard, this answering to something immanent-
ly from out of itself, is crucial to opening Dasein’s individual possibilities. 
The question of being cannot be pursued in abstraction from the one who 
questions, as it concerns “the possibility and necessity of the most radical 
individuation.”58 The question of the sense of being appears to be the most 
abstract, empty, and formal question, “but at the same time it is possible 
to individualize it very precisely for any particular Dasein.”59 According to 
the singular-plural logic of formal indication, the concrete is approachable 
through the empty and formal.60 It is in this sense that the plurality of concrete 
existence is formally indicated through the term “Dasein.” Dasein’s neutrality 
52 SZ, p. 34, italics added.
53 GA 27, p. 4.
54 Gelassenheit (GA 27, p. 401), also note GA 65, p. 26. On Heidegger’s understanding of 
praxis and its role in his thought, see McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, op . cit., pp. 29-39, 99-106.
55 GA 27, pp. 22-23.
56 GA 27, p. 74.
57 GA 27, p. 272. The import of receptivity in Heidegger’s reading of Kant is highlighted by 
the emphasis given to the imagination as operating between sensibility and thought (GA 25).
58 SZ, p. 38.
59 SZ, p. 39.
60 Nancy’s account of Heidegger’s logic of the singular plural is strengthened by relating it 
to formal indication. See J.-L. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. R. D. Richardson and A. E. 
O’Byrne, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
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opens up and indicates the facticity that it in each case singularly is. Dasein as 
a factically existing being is already dispersed in the world and its neutrality is 
consequently in each case “broken” and “shattered.” It is a formally indicating 
neutrality of the non-neutral as, for example, the essence of “neutral Dasein” is 
in each case to be female or male: “The broken neutrality of its essence belongs 
to the essence of the human. This essence can only primarily be made into a 
problem from its neutrality, and only with reference to this neutrality is the 
rupture of neutrality itself possible.”61
The strategy of formally indicating the concrete plurality of factical exist-
ence suggests that the “normative” practice-orienting dimension at work in the 
analytic of Dasein is “meta-ethical” in contrast to the codified prescriptions 
and values of a concrete form of life. Dasein is in part defined by its pragmatic 
activities in Being and Time, and defined as praxis in a related lecture-course.62 
It exists practically and ethically in each case in one way or another, but not 
in one definitive way defined by either rules or virtues, because of the kind of 
existence that it is. Circumscribed by everydayness and still open to possibili-
ties for engaging its everyday existence, the differentiated and non-indifferent 
being Heidegger calls Dasein is formally indicated by meta-ethical terms such 
as responsibility, freedom, conscience, care, and authenticity that inform and 
transverse individual ways of existing.
In a recent work on reification, Verdinglichung, Axel Honneth argues that 
Heidegger’s care is an interactive participatory practice.63 In Honneth’s analy-
sis, care is ultimately inadequate by suggesting that the world is primarily 
disclosed through the “care of the self ” in contrast to the recognition (Anerk-
ennung) of the other.64 Yet care implicates the individual in the practical world 
and everydayness of others and things, such that there is not only an ethical 
relation to the other but to the self and to things. 65 Contrary to Honneth, Da-
sein is not merely self-interested in being described as a care of the self. The ar-
gument of Being and Time indicates that the constitutive ethos of responsiveness 
of care leads it to take on the characteristics of things (that is, when a “who” 
misunderstands itself as a “what”) and everydayness (in which the logic of the 
reified “what” precludes the relational “who”). If Dasein did not see things 
and hear others, it would not lose itself in absorption in them and conscience 
would not be the break that calls it back to itself. Dasein’s vision and hearing 
leads it to reify and forget the openness, freedom, and the possibilities of its 
seeing and listening. Individuation signifies reopening these capacities and 
possibilities. Moving from Begegnung to Auseinandersetzung, Dasein as care is 
61 GA 27, pp. 146-147.
62 GA 27, p. 177.
63 A. Honneth, Verdinglichung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005, pp. 32-34.
64 Ibid., pp. 39-41.
65 On the ethical sense of things, rooted in Heidegger and Zen, see F. Dallmayr, The Other 
Heidegger, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 213-225.
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reoriented from its concerned yet uncaring absorption in everydayness to the 
possibility of individuation through a renewal of its care for its own self and 
thus of its capacities for encountering others. Others are not then left behind 
in this transformation as it indicates the deepening of care for others precisely 
through the care of the self.
Care does not exclude care for the other, although it can and does lose 
and forget itself in everydayness through which the being of care becomes 
an objectively present and thingly “what.” Nevertheless, care is reawakened 
through the enactment of the question “who?” It is the “who” who addresses 
me and who I address as “you.” This claim is always singular by singling me 
and the other out in the “with.”66 In the personal pronouns, “I” and “you,” 
self and other are addressed as beings who are in each case their own: “Because 
Dasein is in each case mineness (Jemeinigkeit), one must always use a personal 
pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am,’ ‘you are.’”67 The other Dasein is ad-
dressed as being in each case its own and as an ecstatically existing “you.” It is 
address (ansprechen) that characterizes the relational individuating “between” 
(Zwischen) of “being-with” (Mitsein), whereas speaking about (besprechen) 
characterizes the pragmatically rooted objectivating language of things.68
If the other were not each time its own (je mein), the possibility of so-
licitude and solidarity (Fürsorge) – the care for the other precisely in its own 
singular mineness69 – is foreclosed. The other would only be an object of use 
(zuhanden) and an objectively present thing (vorhanden), as it is in the logic 
of everydayness. In recognizing the mineness, the singularization of the “each 
time,” of the other, socialization and individuation are bound together. As 
the transformation of the uncaring indifferent socialization of everydayness 
presupposes it, individuation and the recognition of the other’s individuation 
in care do not preclude socialization. The being-with (Mitsein) of co-Dasein 
(Mitdasein) is irremovable and equiprimordial,70 as Dasein is individuated 
as “who” through solicitude and the “with” in answering others.71 Frederick 
Olafson explicates such solicitude in relation to agape and caritas, which is 
appropriate considering Heidegger’s early interest in charity in St. Paul, Au-
gustine, and Luther.72
66 Compare SZ, pp. 42 and 119 with GA 66, p. 148.
67 SZ, p. 42.
68 SZ, p. 45.
69 SZ, pp. 121-124.
70 SZ, p. 114.
71 On the question of the “who” and the import of addressing the other as “you,” see M. 
Heidegger, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache (GA 38, pp. 33-48).
72 F. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics, op . cit., pp. 83-84. On the early religious 
context of care, see J. van Buren, The Young Heidegger, Bloomington: University of Indiana 
Press, 1999, ch. 8, especially pp. 170-171.
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8 . The Hermeneutical Ethics of Auseinandersetzung
Hermeneutics is not an art or technique of interpretation, nor its methodol-
ogy, but a fundamental determination of the being of Dasein.73 Hermeneutics 
is how Dasein comports itself in the world as understanding (verstehen), which 
is already (schon) each time (je) attuned (Stimmung) in one way or another find-
ing itself (Befindlichkeit) within the facticity of the world. Levinas has argued 
that Heideggerian understanding remains Cartesian and intellectualistic.74 But 
understanding is not primarily worldly comprehension from a third-person per-
spective but more fundamentally moved and attuned through moods in relation 
to the world in which it finds itself. Dasein is as much thrown as it is possibility, 
and its possibilities emerge only in relation to its factical life. Its concrete pos-
sibilities can only be understood from out of its thrownness in the world and 
fallenness in everydayness, consequently breaking with and providing means to 
dismantle idealism. Since the nexus of significance is interrupted, plural, and 
shifting, and is not merely ideal but practical-factical, the hermeneutical move-
ment toward origins and the whole does not culminate in a final grasping or 
vision of totality. The interpretive retrieval of the primordial, of authenticity as 
the encounter with the disruptive breakthrough of the originary, confronts a 
past that never was present to and cannot be mastered by understanding. The 
hermeneutical “already,” “always” (meaning each not all), and “always already” 
indicate a “that” prior to all constitution and reflection – that is, the irretrievable 
and traumatic event of the “it” or “there,” which like the “greater reason” spoken 
of by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra precedes the “lesser reason” of “I,” “me,” and the 
consciousness of “my” existence.75
As the practice of phenomenology is already historical, it is called to recog-
nize its own hermeneutical character in order to appropriate and be appropri-
ated toward its own facticity and historicity. Phenomenology cannot rest with 
bracketing the world and takes a historical turn in becoming genealogical, 
generative, and deconstructive.76 It thus requires, if it is ever to address the 
habitual everydayness and the history of metaphysics that informs it, a herme-
neutical turn so as to dismantle its own historical context and sedimentation. 
The movement of destructuring requires dismantling one’s own “ownness,” 
tradition, and everydayness to uncover hidden and closed off possibilities.77 
Interpretation restrains through the transmission of tradition and liberates by 
disclosing possibilities for transformation and individuation through histori-
cal destructuring and differentiating encounter.
Destruktion and Auseinandersetzung are not needed because external struc-
tures are imposed upon the lifeworld by alien systems or totalities. They are 
73 SZ, pp. 37-38.
74 T. Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine, op . cit., pp. 81-82.
75 Note SZ, p. 68.
76 Respectively, SZ, p. 11; SZ p. 20; and SZ, p. 22.
77 SZ, pp. 20-21.
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implicit in the reproduction of the lifeworld itself in its inauthentic every-
dayness and are its potential modification rather than its transcendence. Al-
though everydayness excludes and normalizes the unusual and the different, 
the shocking and the uncanny, these are interwoven in the fabric of everyday 
life itself. Such possibilities, and the alterity already at work within everyday-
ness itself, are disclosed through what Jaspers called limit experiences and 
situations.78 Limit situations potentially place the self-understanding and the 
taken for granted familiarity of the everyday, as the indifferent any and ev-
ery one (das man), into question. In these experiences of the uncanny, the 
questionability and uncertainty of meaning and existence are revealed. Limits 
and uncanniness enable further individuation by placing previous individu-
ation in question, which does not transpire through flight or mastery but 
in embracing the uncanny questionability of being. Because possibilities of 
and for existence are not ordinarily evident, they are awakened through an 
understanding that decenters, although it cannot eliminate, everydayness by 
encountering the uncanny questions of existence in limit experiences such as 
the deepest anxiety or the profoundest boredom.
The historicity and uncanniness that human existence already is, and thus 
can potentially encounter, forces the hermeneutical transformation of phe-
nomenological seeing. Hermeneutics brings out the questionability and unfa-
miliarity of the unquestioned and familiar such that the difference at the heart 
of identity and the non-transparency of Dasein to itself are disclosed. Dasein 
does not grasp itself, it is constantly disturbed and anxious in being referred 
and deferred beyond itself, and is in this sense ecstatic, eccentric, and transcen-
dent. The self is in each case betrayed and endangered in its transcendence-in-
the-world, or in “the each time of the facticity of transcendence.”79 As such, 
Dasein does not first observe and inquire but understands and “intuits the 
world” through encounter, confrontation, and conflict.80 Phenomenological 
lucidity and transparency discloses the factical ruination and non-transparen-
cy of thrown and fallen Dasein, which has fallen from the heightening of its 
own transcendence as stepping out from beings.81 Absorbed amidst beings, 
Dasein does not know itself and remains a question for itself, as it is both 
closest to and farthest away from itself.
Inexorably drawn, referred, and dispersed beyond itself, the phenomeno-
logical receptiveness of human existence fails to “return to the things them-
selves.” Responsiveness is impossible to the extent that it is absorbed and fall-
en in everydayness and its theoretical offshoots, and therefore fundamentally 
forgetful and non-responsive to the being that is in question. By following 
through on this responsiveness, through the disquieting moment and the de-
structuring of misunderstood traditions, we encounter the non-responsiveness 
78 Compare Heidegger’s discussion in PM, p. 7; SZ, 301n.
79 GA 27, pp. 358 and 367.
80 GA 27, pp. 367-368 and 382-390.
81 GA 27, pp. 207-208.
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of existence in its fundamental difference and uncanniness. Responsiveness, as 
worldly and historical, is referred to and thus deferred through the necessity 
of destructuring and conflictual encounter that would reawaken its own most 
possibilities of hearing and answering.
The encounter with historicity, which some wish to divorce from the ethi-
cal, led Heidegger to distinguish the study of history as objective history (His-
torie) and history as enactment and event (Geschichte). The historical relation 
to history, the history that Dasein is, is not given and transparent to everyday 
Dasein, but demands differentiating confrontation.82 Without awakening the 
questionability of historicity, object-history and historiology work to secure 
everyday life in its self-satisfaction and flight, reifying the transmission of the 
past such that it prevents its being encountered.83 This illuminates Heidegger’s 
statement that tradition equally makes possible and impossible. Whereas tra-
dition “takes way [Dasein’s] own guidance, its questioning and deciding” inso-
far as, “[w]hen tradition becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it 
‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible [...] that it rather becomes concealed”84, the 
language of everydayness, its “idle talk” (Gerede) holds back and discourages 
“any new questioning and all differentiating encounter.”85 The ambivalence 
of tradition, including traditional ethics, points toward interdependence and 
differentiation, continuity and transformation, as difference is persistently 
tied to that from which it sets itself apart.
For Heidegger, participation in the openness of the there (da) and with (mit) 
involves differentiation as much as it does identification. Heideggerian partici-
pation is not pagan or mystical absorption. It is differentiating communication, 
as Dasein is mit-teilend teil-nehmen.86 The event of coming together and setting-
apart in communication shows how Dasein does not escape or master its every-
day life, much less others, but occurs only in relation to and by modifying it:
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which 
Dasein has grown, in the first instance, without the possibility of extraction. 
In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and 
communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed.87
9 . Confronting the Question of Ethics
This paper has not proposed that Heidegger needs to be an ethicist to be 
relevant, that he developed an ethics in a comprehensive sense, or that he is 
an esoteric thinker of a secret doctrine of “ethics without ethics.” Nonetheless, 
82 SZ, p. 98.
83 SZ, pp. 19-27.
84 SZ, p. 21.
85 “[J]edes neue Fragen und alle Auseinandersetzung” in SZ, p. 169.
86 GA 27, p. 130.
87 SZ, p. 169.
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as Fred Dallmayr has noted, “Heidegger’s entire opus is suffused with ethical 
preoccupations” and rejects prevailing models of ethical discourses rather than 
ethical questions.88 As recent research has confirmed, the ethical dimension 
of Heidegger’s early thinking is irreducible to yet can be clearly elucidated in 
light of his reception of previous philosophical and religious thinkers, particu-
larly Aristotle.89 I have focused on issues of individuation and difference as 
questions of praxis, and articulated these questions through the phenomenon 
of being called or addressed and through the relationship between individu-
ated existence and its everydayness and being-with-others. The individuation 
of mineness, which is the possibility of decision and choice instead of being a 
static property or affirmation of egoism, transpires in relation to what is not and 
cannot be my own and the attuned understanding that Dasein in each case is 
or is not. As an event, understanding is more than the subjective and solipsis-
tic egoism feared by critics.90 No matter how alone, isolated, or solipsistic, the 
self has the structure of being-in-the-world and being-with-others.91 Dasein is 
its relational socialization and individuation, occurring through address and 
being addressed (ansprechen and angesprochen), hearing and listening (anhören 
and zuhören), and claiming and being claimed (Anspruch). Heidegger articu-
lates these through interdependent conflict (Widerstreit) and the interpretive 
encounter of responsive confrontation (verstehende Auseinandersetzung),92 
such that the identity and difference of Dasein and Mitsein are modifications 
of average being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). These relationships be-
tween Dasein and its other repeat and deepen the identity of everydayness or 
they interruptively occur as individuation in a responsive yet differentiating 
setting apart (Auseinandersetzung) with the other.
Heidegger further explored this nexus of address and conflict, the commu-
nicative event of logos and polemos that initiates the opportunity for consensus 
and dis-sensus through reasons, in his transitional works of the mid-1930s. In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, listening confrontation occurs as question and an-
swer concerning the violence and uncanniness of the human. The problematic 
of “responsive confrontation” is transformed in the Beiträge as it is rethought 
88 F. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, op . cit., pp. 109 and 130-131.
89 See especially W. McNeill, The Glance of the Eye, op . cit., ch. 2.
90 Levinas equates the interest in “being” with an interest in “my own being” to the exclu-
sion of the other. Conatus, will, or social-Darwinistic “survival instinct” is at the root of being 
and its violence. See E. Levinas, Entre nous: Thinking of the Other, trans. M. B. Smith and B. 
Harshav, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. xii. R. Bernasconi examines Levinas’s 
critique of Heidegger as relying on the self-assertion of will and ego in a biologistic “struggle for 
existence” (Kampf ums Dasein) in his paper “Levinas and the Struggle for Existence”, published 
in E. S. Nelson, A. Kapust, K. Still (eds.), Addressing Levinas, Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 2005, pp. 170-184.
91 J.-L. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, op . cit., p. 96.
92 Compare the early use of this expression (GA 61, p. 2) with the later use in Wege zur 
Aussprache (GA 13, pp. 15-21).
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out of the “between” and the abyssal divide. In “Wege zur Aussprache” (1937), 
Heidegger spoke of an interpretive confrontation (verstehende Auseinanderset-
zung) involving a recognition of the other that does not suppress the differ-
ence between self and other.93 This is a conflict (Streit) not for the sake of strife 
but for the other.94 The relation of self and other does not demand the identity 
of recognition, it can occur in the individuation of mutual understanding. 
For Heidegger, difference (Unter-schied) is announced in hearing95 yet we are 
inexperienced in hearing and our ears are overcome by what prevents such a 
responsive confrontation and hearing.
Auseinandersetzung is already at work in his early hermeneutics of facticity,96 
and its weight increases in the mid- and late 1930s.97 It is noteworthy that 
Heidegger’s early thinking of violence and conflict is bound to the possibility 
of a thinking of agon and polemos, which is unfolded in his works as Streit, 
Widerstreit, and Auseinandersetzung.98 Such terms are not only negative; they 
indicate the complex and plural nexus of factical life and its understanding 
in the context of the communicative event, history, and thinking of being. 
These words indicate the originariness of violence and trauma in Heidegger’s 
thought, i.e., a thinking that enables encountering and questioning the con-
stitutive role of violence and trauma in human existence without descending 
to a glorification of brutality and violence or absorption in a biologistic “strug-
gle for existence” or ideological “battle of world-views.”99 Care is indeed care 
for one’s “daily bread” in one of Heidegger’s earliest formulations of Sorge, 
93 “Verst�ndigung im eigentlichem Sinne ist der überlegene Mut zur Anerkennung des je 
Eigenen des anderen aus einer übergreifenden Notwendigkeit” (GA 13, p. 16).
94 GA 13, pp. 15-21.
95 Compare the discussions of the significance of hearing in GA 55, pp. 238-260; and C. 
Scott, “Zuspiel and Entscheidung: A reading of sections 81-82 in Die Beiträge zur Philosophie” in 
Philosophy Today: v. 41, pp. 161-167.
96 GA 61, p. 2. Also compare GA 59, p. 91; GA 60, pp. 9, 53; GA 63, pp. 5, 32, 72; GA 
17, p. 3.
97 Charles Scott remarks about Auseinandersetzung and hearing: “This Auseinandersetzung in 
its leonine aspect is also conditioned by an effort on [Heidegger’s] part to hear the way in which 
philosophy presents things, to hear philosophical thinking in a way that is appropriate to it, and 
to give voice to his differences from it as he encounters it. This hearing aspect that conditions 
Auseinandersetzung constitutes a Zwiesprache […].” C. Scott, “Zuspiel and Entscheidung”, art . 
cit ., pp. 162-163.
98 Heidegger deploys such language prior to his focused engagement with Nietzsche in the 
1930’s. An early source of such language is Dilthey, for whom life and history are not placid 
identities but conditioned by conflict (Streit) and even an irreconcilable conflict (Widerstreit) 
undermining the possibility of metaphysical totality. Compare W. Dilthey, Weltanschauungsleh-
re, B. Groethuysen (ed.), second edition, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960, pp. 
98, 131-134, 152. The conflict (Widerstreit), difference (Unterschied), and incommensurability 
of discourses, sciences and worldviews rest in the agonistic multiplicity (Streit) of life.
99 An extended account of this topic can be found in my paper “Traumatic Origins: His-
tory, Genealogy, and Violence in Nietzsche and Heidegger,” in B. Babich, A. Denker, and H. 
Zaborowski (eds.), Heidegger und Nietzsche, Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming.
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but he explicitly rejects the idea that care is part of a “struggle for existence” 
(Kampf ums Dasein) between entities.100 Heidegger is not only warning of a 
superficial application of Darwinism to social realities but the use of such 
ideas in the popularized Lebensphilosophie of the time. His Post-World War I 
confrontation with the “struggle for existence” in Spengler is extended in the 
late 1930s to biologism, biologically based racism, and the combination of 
politicized social Darwinism (with its racialized fate) and vulgarized vitalistic 
Lebensphilosophie (asserting the priority of irrational choice and the decision-
istic will) distinctive of National Socialism.101
The interdependent difference and responsive conflict “for” – i.e., für, not 
um – the other102 offers the means of destructuring the agon of wills, self-inter-
est, and self-assertion that critics like Levinas locate in Heidegger. Heidegger 
argued in the Beiträge that calculative thought concerning the preservation of 
self and species belongs to the darkening of the world and destruction of the 
earth.103 The posthumously published works of the 1930s increasingly show 
how Heidegger challenged biologism, gigantism, racism, worship of power, 
frenzied commitment to the total mobilization of society, and the nihilism 
of abandoning all thought and reflection in the name of “values.” By con-
trast, Heidegger’s other thinking strives for an “other attitude” in which man 
“does not calculate under the compulsion of utility and from the unrest of 
consumption.”104 Heidegger attempted to think the en- and dis-owning event 
or Ereignis, beyond all agon and even polemos, as the primordial difference 
(Austrag) and confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) of gods and humans, world 
and earth, which reveals again ethical preoccupations.105 Against the assertion 
of the will, and its total mobilization of reified values, purposes, and tech-
niques, Heidegger’s thought imperfectly suggests the possibility of a different 
ethos and poetics of responsive dwelling.106
Heidegger’s hermeneutical meta-ethics, which is not a commitment to or 
a denial of a particular variety of ethics or set of norms, values or virtues, dis-
closes a plurality of concrete ways of understanding, existing, and dwelling.107 
On this point, Heidegger is closer to the deontological plurality of goods and 
ways of life than to its virtue-ethical identity and unity. Žižek criticizes the 
“formalism” of Heidegger’s ethics, which he argues is akin to the formalism of 
Habermas, failing to note the non-determinate or non-subsumptive character 
of this non-deontological formalism that discloses the concrete singularity 
100 GA 61, p. 90 and p. 134 respectively.
101 GA 65, p. 482.
102 GA 27, pp. 22-23 and 327.
103 GA 65, 277.
104 GA 51, pp. 4-5.
105 GA 67, p. 77.
106 On the ethics of dwelling and its environmental import, see my article: “Responding to 
Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger and Ecology,” Environmental Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
Fall 2004, pp. 65-74.
107 PM, p. 21.
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and plurality of individuated existence through formal indication.108 As it is as 
much an ethical as a methodological strategy, the formal indication of a plu-
rality of particular ways of dwelling, of being called and answering in return, 
resists the reduction to the indifference of ethical relativism and the particu-
larism and reactionary nostalgia of one exclusive form of life.
The implicit ethical dimension of Heidegger’s thought has been explicated 
in the context of various forms of ethical theory from communitarianism to 
cosmopolitanism.109 Although these might be legitimate attempts to think 
with Heidegger beyond Heidegger, insofar as they continue to distinguish his 
works from their ethical reconstruction, the latter interpretations are highly 
problematic as accounts of Heidegger’s works. Heidegger’s questioning of 
everydayness, the tradition, and self-mastery, and his emphasis on individu-
ation and differentiation challenges the premises of communitarianism and 
virtue-ethics; while universalism, humanism, and cosmopolitanism continue 
to be problematically part of the history of metaphysics and inadequate to the 
event, enactment, and ethos or ethical art of human existence.
10 . Conclusion
Factical and finite practical life, individuating itself through its practical 
interpretive practices, is already ethical. Unlike the theoretical discourses of 
ethics, this sense of the ethical is not regional or secondary, since it is the ethos, 
dwelling, and being-in-the-world of human existence itself. 110 As existence, 
the ethical does not consist of rules or virtues to be followed or aimed at or 
something to be added on to existence.
The question whether ethical responsiveness and attentiveness to the par-
ticularity of the situation and singularity of the other is enough to generate 
ethics requires further investigation. Given that the ethical has been portrayed 
here through attunement, comportment, and an ethos or art of existing, can it 
transcend the self of Dasein to ethical alterity? Can one arrive at the ethical, 
which is often thought of in terms of duties, obligations, and responsibilities, 
through such letting be and releasement without introducing a more robust 
responsibility and capacity for ethical deliberation, especially in situations of 
conflict between two phenomena or ethical claims?
This paper has taken the first steps in responding to such questions to the 
extent that (1) the ethical import of Heidegger’s philosophy transcends both 
indifferent neutrality and nihilism and (2) it can be a perceptive contribution 
to articulating the import of the ethical despite – and as a basis for critique 
108 S. Žižek, The Parallax View, op . cit., p. 87.
109 See L. Vogel, The Fragile “We”, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994, pp. 120-
125, on the possibility of a cosmopolitan reconstruction of authenticity.
110 See the discussion of the later Heidegger and Derrida on the historically derivative char-
acter of the discourse of ethics in S. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, op . cit., pp. 15-16.
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of – his own reprehensible personal involvement in the extremist national-
ism of National Socialism during the early 1930s. His meta-ethical analysis 
is irreducible to or at least not refuted by the ethics of his own individual 
practices. If responsiveness and generosity towards others and things can be 
distinguished from hierarchical subordination, i.e., being claimed by and gen-
erously responding to others and things differentiated from being passively 
subjected to and violently dominated by irrational powers, then the ethics of 
facticity, finitude, and individuation sketched in this paper can be more than 
a fragmentary hint of the ethical.111 Even if the preceding claim is excessively 
hopeful, Heidegger remains pertinent for the myriad ways in which his works 
continue to signify the questionability of the ethical – a questionability that 
cannot be rightfully said to exist exclusively in the past.
111  This is further developed in my article: “Heidegger and the Ethics of Facticity,” in F. Raf-
foul and E. S. Nelson (eds.), Rethinking Facticity, Albany: SUNY Press, 2008, pp. 129-147.

